Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) by Cabaniss,, George M., Jr.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 3 Article 13
Winter 1992
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
George M. Cabaniss, Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
George M. Cabaniss, Jr., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 929 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol19/iss3/13
Constitutional Law-Tm FIRST AvMNDMENT, NUDE DANCING, AND
JUDICIAL AcTmvsm-Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
GEORGE M. CABANISS, JR.
iLORIDA, like all but three states, prohibits indecent exposure.' In
1 1971, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in Hoffman v. Carson2
that the state's indecent exposure statute prohibited nude dancing in
such public places as bars and lounges.' Such dancing, the court deter-
mined, was conduct rather than speech, and therefore, it was not pro-
tected under the First Amendment.4
The correctness of the Florida high court's ruling came into ques-
tion only a year later when the United States Supreme Court, in Cali-
fornia v. LaRue,5 reviewed the constitutionality of certain restrictions
placed on establishments that served alcoholic beverages. Although it
decided the case on a basis other than the First Amendment, the
Court in LaRue implicitly affirmed in dicta that topless and bottom-
less dancing were constitutionally protected types of expression. 6 Sub-
sequently, in Doran v. Salem Inn,7 the Court expanded on the LaRue
dicta, observing that "[a]lthough the customary 'barroom' type of
nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected ex-
pression, we [recognize] ... that this form of entertainment might be
entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some
circumstances."" Six years later, the Court ended its equivocation and
1. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
The Florida indecent exposure statute, section 800.03, Florida Statutes (1989), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to expose or exhibit his sexual organs in any
public place or on the private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be seen
from such private premises, in a vulgar or indecent manner, or so to expose or exhibit
his person in such place, or to go or be naked in such place. Provided, however, this
section shall not be construed to prohibit the exposure of such organs or the person in
any place provided or set apart for that purpose. Any person convicted of a violation
hereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in §
775.082 or § 775.083.
2. 250 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1971).
3. Id. at 893.
4. Id. at 893-94.
5. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
6. Id. at 118; see also JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DINES, HANDBOOK OF FREE
SPEECH AND FREE PRESS § 5:1 n.4, at 190 (1979).
7. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
8. Id. at 932 (emphasis added).
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stated categorically in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim9 that
"nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protec-
tions . ..",0
After Schad, the constitutionally protected status of nude dancing
appeared settled. However, in 1986, Justice White, the author of
Schad, and Justice Brennan asserted that the categorical language
used in Schad did not definitively place nude dancing under the pro-
tection of the First Amendment." Like Justices Brennan and White,
state courts have been unsure as to the constitutional status of nude
dancing. 12 Not even the United States Courts of Appeals have been in
agreement. 3
With Barnes v. Glen Theatre,'4 the Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed the issue of nude dancing, the First Amendment, and the role
of state regulation. Indirectly, and perhaps more importantly, the
Court affirmed the role it would play in future First Amendment free
speech cases. Because Glen Theatre may affect enforcement of Flori-
da's indecent exposure statute as well as various local ordinances, this
Note will discuss the constitutionality of regulating expressive con-
duct, describe the development of the Glen Theatre case, analyze the
Glen Theatre decision and how it relates to First Amendment jurispru-
dence, and note the status of Florida antinudity law and ordinances in
light of Glen Theatre.
I. REGULAT NG ExP1 ssIVE CONDUCT
Dancing, whether performed in the nude or otherwise, is not
"speech" as the term is usually used. Rather, dancing is a type of
conduct. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in Glen Theatre argued that the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause protected their right to dance
nude in a public establishment. 15 To fully understand the claims of the
9. 452U.S. 61(1981).
10. Id. at 66.
11. Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (joined by Brennan, J.).
12. E.g., Alexander v. Severson, 408 N.W.2d 195 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (nude dancing did
not convey a message requiring constitutional protection); Trombetta v. Mayor and Comm'rs of
Atlantic City, 436 A.2d 1349 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981), affdper curiam, 454 A.2d 900
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (ordinance criminalizing nude dancing unconstitutional per
Schad).
13. E.g., Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott, 899 F.2d 1502, 1507 (6th Cir. 1990) (nude dancing
not a fundamental right); Krueger v. Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (l1th Cir. 1985) (ordinance bar-
ring topless dancing held unconstitutional).
14. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
15. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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plaintiffs in Glen Theatre regarding the relationship between conduct,
speech, and the First Amendment, it may be helpful to briefly exam-
ine the development of Free Speech Clause jurisprudence and the role
played by the Twenty-first Amendment 6 in regulating expressive con-
duct. The Twenty-first Amendment allows states to regulate otherwise
protected speech when it occurs in establishments that sell alcoholic
beverages.
A. Early Standards
For most of this nation's history, the only type of speech protected
by the First Amendment was oral, that is, "pure speech." 1 7 Not until
1931, with Stromberg v. California,8 did the Court expand the scope
of the First Amendment to include nonoral, symbolic expression. In
Stromberg, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a California
statute that prohibited the display of a red flag "as a sign, symbol or
opposition to organized government."' 9 Free political discussion, the
Court stressed, was a "fundamental principle of the nation's constitu-
tional system," and any law that would punish someone for entering
such a discussion by the use of a symbolic flag was repugnant. 2°
Nine years after Stromberg, the Court again expanded the scope of
the First Amendment with its decision in Thornhill v. Alabama,2 1
which concerned picketing. With Thornhill, the Court acknowledged
that certain types of conduct, such as peaceful picketing, were such an
integral part of the communication process that the conduct was pro-
tected under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 22
For most of the nation's history, this prohibition applied only to the federal government. In
1925, however, the Court ruled that the prohibition applied to the states as a liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Gitlow opposed
dicta in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922), which stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed no restrictions on the states concerning freedom of speech. 268 U.S. at
666. However, applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the states did not help Gitiow, who had
been convicted of advocating the unlawful, violent overthrow of the government. Such speech,
the Court held, was not protected. Id.
For an explanation and well reasoned critique of the Incorporation Doctrine, see RAOuL BER-
OER, Tim FouraTEm AmENDMENT AND nm BmL OF Riorrs (1989).
16. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides that "[t]he transportation or impor-
tation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CoNsr. amend.
XXI, § 2.
17. See JOHN E. NowAx Er AL., CoNsTrrunoNAL LAW ch. 18 § XIV A., at 988 (2d ed.
1983); BARRON & DmrENs, supra note 6, § 3:11, at 111.
18. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
19. Id. at 369.
20. Id.
21. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
22. LAURENCE H. TRmE, AMmuCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 826 (2d ed. 1988).
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Despite the protections given by the First Amendment, no speech-
whether pure, symbolic, or "speech plus"-has absolute protection
from government regulation. 23 The standard of analysis used by the
Court to determine the level of protection given particular types of
speech has historically varied. In Stromberg, for example, the Court
relied upon sweeping generalizations rather than a carefully crafted
standard of analysis. 24 "ITihe maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion," the Court reasoned, "[w]as a fundamental prin-
ciple of our constitutional system." 25 Although the Court's decision to
protect symbolic speech under the First Amendment was remarkable
for its time, the Court's vague generalizations provided no standard
by which courts could protect future incidents of symbolic speech. 26
Indeed, until 1968, when it promulgated the standards of United
States v. O'Brien,"' the Court used various ad hoc balancing tests to
determine the constitutionality of restrictions on speech and expressive
conduct. With O'Brien, the Court finally established a constitutional
standard for Free Speech Clause jurisprudence. 28
B. The O'Brien Standard
One morning in March 1966, David Paul O'Brien burned his draft
card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse to protest the Viet-
nam War and the selective service system. 29 This act violated a federal
statute that prohibited the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft
cards. In his defense, O'Brien claimed that burning his card was an
act of symbolic speech and as such was entitled to the protection of
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Warren, rejected O'Brien's claim, observing that the
Court could not "accept the view that an apparently limitless variety
of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."' 30
In a series of cases ending with Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957), the Court
upheld state laws that banned peaceful picketing for illegal purposes. To distinguish these cases
from Thornhill, Justice Frankfurter said that picketing was "speech plus" and that states could,
under some circumstances, regulate the "plus" that is conduct. Id.
23. See NowAK, supra note 17, ch. 18, § III A., at 864-67.
This Note will only be concerned with restrictions applied to expressive conduct. For discus-
sion on restrictions of pure speech, see TsuBn, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 789-94.
24. David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. ML43U L. REv. 491, 501
(1988).
25. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
26. Day, supra note 24, at 502.
27. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
28. See Day, supra note 24, at 503; NowAK, supra note 17, ch. 18, § III A., at 864-67.
29. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70.
30. Id. at 376.
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In rejecting O'Brien's demand for First Amendment protection, the
Court implicitly established a two-track system of First Amendment
analysis for freedom of speech cases. 3' The first track encompasses
those regulations that seek to restrict the message communicated by a
particular act.32 Such regulations are strictly scrutinized by the Court
and are considered unconstitutional unless the communication is in an
excluded category of speech or the government can show a compelling
interest.3 3 If, however, the government restrictions are unrelated to the
conduct's message but are aimed at the noncommunicative aspect of
the conduct, the Court's analysis proceeds down a separate track. On
this second track, the Court balances the values of free speech against
the government's regulatory interest on a case-by-case basis. 4
When, as in O'Brien, a course of conduct combines both "speech"
and "nonspeech" elements, the Court will use the second track of
analysis to determine if the governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element is sufficiently important to justify incidental limi-
tations on First Amendment freedoms. 35 To determine the sufficiency
of the government's interest, the Court in O'Brien established a four-
prong test: (1) the regulations must be within the constitutional power
of the government; (2) the regulations must further an important or
substantial governmental interest; (3) the government's interest must
be unrelated to the suppression of the expression; and (4) the inciden-
tal restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms must be no
31. See TamE, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 789-94; BARRON & DmNms, supra note 6, § 5:3, at
195-203; GEin GuNrrna, INDlvmuAsJ Rmars IN CONSTrUmTIONAL LAw ch. 7, § 3, 835-62 (4th
ed. 1986).
32. TamE, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 791-92.
33. GUNTHER, supra note 31, ch. 7, § 3, at 841; Day, supra note 24, at 494-952; BARRON &
DmNws, supra note 6, § 5:1, at 191.
Summarizing excluded categories of speech, the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) stated:
There are certain well-defimed and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality. (footnotes omitted).
34. TaME, supra note 22, § 12-2, at 792.
35. Id.
Interestingly, the Court in O'Brien never acknowledged that burning a draft card had a
"speech" element that needed protection; it only made an assumption for purposes of deciding
the issue. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 ("[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communica-
tive element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment...
(emphasis added).
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greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.3 6 Upon com-
pleting its four-prong test, the O'Brien Court determined that Con-
gress' interest in prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was
sufficient to justify the restrictions placed on O'Brien's right to com-
municate a message by burning his draft card.3 7
C. The Twenty-first Amendment
The constitutional standard established by the Court in O'Brien
only applies to restrictions that arise under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment, not the Twenty-first Amendment. 3 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted the broad sweep of the Twenty-first
Amendment to confer more than the general police powers already
vested in the states.39 Indeed, the Twenty-first Amendment insulates
the states from other provisions of the Constitution. For example,
Congress cannot use the powers granted under the Commerce Clause
to limit how states restrict the importation of intoxicants when they
are destined for use, distribution, or consumption within that state. 0
The Twenty-first Amendment even transcends most of the limitations
placed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.41 As the Court
noted in State Board v. Young's Market Co.,42 a classification recog-
nized under the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 43 The Due Process Clause's fundamental no-
tice and hearing requirements, however, bind the states when they reg-
ulate alcoholic beverages. 44
Like the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment, the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment cannot be used to limit the
reach of the Twenty-first Amendment. 45 In California v. LaRue, the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by
California's Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control that forbade
acts of gross sexuality in establishments licensed by the state to serve
liquor.46 The Court reaffirmed that the Twenty-first Amendment
36. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
37. Id. at 381-82.
38. See generally NOwAK, supra note 17, ch. 18 § XVII, at 1024-25 (states under the
Twenty-first Amendment allowed greater freedom to regulate speech when using the power to
regulate sale of liquor).
39. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
40. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964).
41. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 115.
42. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
43. Id. at 64.
44. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
45. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
46. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110-12.
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grants states the power to totally prohibit the sale of liquor within its
borders. 47 If a state can completely prohibit the sale of alcoholic bev-
erages, the Court in LaRue held, it has wide latitude in establishing
licensing requirements to include the prohibition of gross sexuality
and other types of conduct that might be protected under the First
Amendment .48
A number of attempts have been made to limit the Court's holding
in LaRue, but each has been rejected. For example, the plaintiffs in
New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca49 argued that a New
York law prohibiting topless dancing in establishments that sold alco-
holic beverages was unconstitutional. LaRue was distinguishable, the
plaintiffs believed, because the California statute prohibited acts of
"gross sexuality" and was supported by legislative findings that justi-
fied the law.-1 The New York statute was unconstitutional as applied
to topless dancing, the plaintiffs averred, because there were no legis-
lative findings that topless dancing posed the same types of problems
as acts of "gross sexuality." 5 2 Rejecting their arguments, the Court
held that "[w]hatever artistic or communicative value may attach to
topless dancing is overcome by the State's exercise of its broad powers
arising under the Twenty-First Amendment."53 The power to com-
pletely ban the sale of alcoholic beverages, the Court stressed, "in-
cludes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where
topless dancing occurs." ' 54
II. GLEN THEATRE: GAYLE AND CARLA WANT TO DANCE
On the night of March 27, 1985, the South Bend, Indiana Police
Department arrested two women and charged them with violating In-
diana's indecency statute. s This was approximately the eleventh arrest
47. Id. at 114.
48. Id. at 118.
49. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
50. Id. at 717.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 718.
54. Id. at 717.
55. Glen Theatre v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728, 729 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
The indecency statute, IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988), states:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: (1) Engages in sex-
ual intercourse; (2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct; (3) Appears in a state of nu-
dity; or (4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public
indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area,
or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
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at the Chippewa Bookstore16 since March 1983 on the same charge-
appearing nude in a public place. 57 To halt enforcement of the inde-
cency statute in this factual context, Glen Theatre and two employee
dancers, Gayle Sutro and Carla Johnson, filed suit in federal district
court, requesting an injunction.5 s They claimed that the indecency
statute was overbroad and deterred them from legitimately exercising
their First Amendment rights.5 9 The district court agreed and granted
an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute against the plain-
tiffs. 60 The court found that the statute by its terms empowered law
enforcement officials to arrest and prosecute not only nude dancers at
the Chippewa Bookstore, but also people performing such legal activi-
ties as modeling nude for an art class at a university. 61 Such broad
language, the court emphasized, would deter legitimate expression. 62
By finding the statute overbroad, the district court directly contra-
dicted an earlier finding by the Indiana Supreme Court. In State v.
Baysinger,63 the state's highest court had given the indecency statute a
limiting construction to save it from a facial overbreadth attack: only
nudity that was part of some larger form of expression merited First
Amendment protection. 4 The statute, therefore, could be used to pro-
hibit nude entertainment in nightclubs and other establishments open
to the public. 65 In disregarding Baysinger, the district court relied on
language in Schad that seemed to provide First Amendment protec-
tion to nonobscene nude dancing.66
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court, holding that the statute was not overbroad. 67 The appellate
court noted that the Supreme Court had summarily dismissed the Bay-
singer appeal for want of a substantial federal question. 68 This dis-
missal made the indecency statute immune to overbreadth
56. Owned by Glen Theatre, Inc., the bookstore featured adult written and printed materi-
als, movie showings, as well as nude and seminude live entertainment. It did not sell alcoholic
beverages. Glen Theatre, 726 F. Supp. at 729.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 731.
60. Id. at 733.
61. Id. at 732.
62. Id.
63. 272 Ind. 236 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931 (1980)
(want of a substantial federal question).
64. Id. at 247.
65. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1990).(en banc) (Pos-
ner, J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
66. Glen Theatre, 726 F. Supp. at 731-32.
67. Glen Theatre v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1986).
68. Id. at 288-89.
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challenges. 69 The Seventh Circuit, in its reversal, emphasized that Bay-
singer and other Indiana case law narrowed the reach of the statute to
those instances of public nudity in which conduct, not expression, was
involved. 70 The appeals court remanded the case and directed the dis-
trict court to examine the plaintiffs' dances and determine if they
should be afforded First Amendment protection. 71
On remand, the district court consolidated Glen Theatre with two
similar suits and viewed video tapes of the nude dance acts.7 2 The
court found the dance acts to be basically identical: a fully clothed
woman danced to one or more songs as she removed clothing until
naked or nearly so. The nude dances, also known as stripteases, took
place indoors on a stage or bar. The dances were not part of any play
or dramatic performance. As a result, the district court held that the
plaintiffs' nude dances were not protected by the First Amendment;
the stripteases were conduct, not speech; the stripteases did not ex-
press any ideas.7 3
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit again reversed the district court,
finding the indecency statute unconstitutional.7 4 The appellate court
held that nonobscene nude dancing performed as entertainment was
expression and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. 5
Subsequently, the court vacated its opinion and granted a rehearing. 76
After the rehearing, the appellate court confirmed its earlier ruling. 77
Nude barroom dancing, the Seventh Circuit stressed, was inherently
expressive and presumptively entitled to protection under the First
Amendment 8.7 The court based its ruling on a series of Supreme Court
holdings starting with LaRue and ending with FW/PBS v. City of
69. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1127 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (subsequent rehearing en banc
discussing earlier reasoning).
70. Glen Theatre, 802 F.2d at 289.
71. Id. at 290-91.
72. The first suit, Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, Case Number S85-598, involved the
Kitty Kat lounge and Ms. Darlene Miller. On July 27, 1985, Kitty Kat dancers, including Ms.
Miller, danced nude until about 2:50 a.m., when South Bend police officers informed the propri-
etor that arrests would be made if the nude dancing continued. The nude dancing stopped; no
arrests were made. Glen Theatre v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 420 (1988).
The second suit, Diamond v. Civil City of South Bend, Case Number S85-722, involved nude
dancers at Ramona's Car Wash and Ace-Hi Lounge. They later withdrew from the case. 695 F.
Supp. 414, 421.
73. Glen Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 419.
74. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1989).
75. Id. at 827.
76. Id. at 826.
77. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1082.
78. Id. at 1084.
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Dallas,79 a case that involved the regulation of sexually oriented busi-
nesses through zoning, licensing, and inspection schemes. The appeals
court noted that none of the Justices in FW/PBS, with the exception
of Justice Scalia in dissent, took issue with the plurality's implicit rec-
ognition that nude dancing had First Amendment protection. 0 The
state of Indiana appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision to the Su-
preme Court, which granted certiorari.8
III. TiH GLEN TREATRE DECISION
The Court in Glen Theatre upheld the constitutionality of the Indi-
ana indecency statute on a five to four vote, but no single rationale
received the support of the majority. 82 Indeed, although four members
of the Court's majority agreed that O'Brien was the valid mode of
analysis in determining the indecency statute's constitutionality, they
did not agree as to which governmental interest justified the statute.8 3
The fifth Justice not only disagreed that O'Brien was applicable, but
he also advanced the proposition that Glen Theatre did not even pres-
ent a First Amendment issue.A4
A. Applying O'Brien
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a three member plurality,
agreed with the respondents that the nude dances they wished to per-
form were expressive conduct "within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, although only marginally so."'85 The Chief Justice em-
phasized that the Indiana indecency statute banned all public nudity,
not just nude dancing. 86 He framed the constitutional issue, therefore,
as a conduct restriction that incidentally infringed on communication
protected by the First Amendment. Justice Souter agreed with the plu-
rality that the respondents' nude dancing was subject to a degree of
First Amendment protection and that the statute was directed at pub-
lic nudity, not dancing. 7 Justice Souter also agreed with the Chief
Justice that because the nude dances had both speech and nonspeech
elements, the four part O'Brien test was the proper mode of constitu-
tional analysis.88 However, while the plurality relied on the sufficiency
79. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990) (Paris!!).
80. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1085.
81. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
82. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, I IIS. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1991).
83. Id. at 2468-69 (Souter, J. concurring).
84. Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J. concurring).
85. Id. at 2457.
86. Id. at 2460.
87. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
88. Id.
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of society's moral views to justify incidental regulation, Justice Souter
relied on secondary effects.89
1. Protecting Morals and Public Order
As required by the first prong of the O'Brien test, the Court found
the statute to be within the constitutional powers of Indiana. 9° The
Court noted that protecting morals and public order was a traditional
aspect of state police power. Indeed, citing Bowers v. Hardwick,91 the
Court reemphasized that laws are "constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated ... the courts [would] be very busy indeed." 92
The Court also found that, in furthering a substantial governmental
interest, the statute met the second prong of O'Brien.93 The Court dis-
missed the significance of the statute not having a legislative historyY4
By reading the text of the statute and reviewing the legal history, the
Court believed it could discern the state's interest. Historically, under
the common law, public indecency, including nudity, was a criminal
offense. The Court stressed that this common law restriction on con-
duct reflected society's moral disapproval of people appearing naked
among strangers in public places. 95 The Court also noted that the stat-
ute was the latest in a long line of state laws that banned all public
nudity and was not a recent innovation directed at nude barroom
dancing. 6
Despite respondents' argument to the contrary, the Court held that
the statute satisfied the third prong of O'Brien.97 If Indiana restricted
nudity on moral grounds, the respondents' argued, it followed that
the state had in fact restricted nude dancing because of its expressive-
ness. In rejecting plaintiffs' argument, the Court echoed O'Brien,
stating that it did not believe that a limitless variety of conduct could
be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaged in the conduct in-
tended to express some idea.98 "It is possible," the Court continued,
89. Id. at 2468-69.
90. Glen Theatre, I11 S. Ct. at 2460.
91. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
92. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
93. Id. at 2461.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Indiana's interest in proscribing public nudity predates the advent of barroom nude
dancing. As early as 1831, Indiana punished persons for "open and notorious lewdness ... or
any grossly scandalous and public indecency." Id.
97. Id. at 2462-63.
98. Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
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"to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes... but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment." The Court was not
convinced that when Indiana applied the statute to nude dancing it
was seeking to proscribe nudity because of some erotic message the
dancers might be trying to convey. Indeed, the Court noted that nu-
merous other erotic performances were presented at the plaintiffs' es-
tablishments without any interference by the state. The requirement
that the dancer wear pasties and a G-string did not deprive the dance
of an erotic message, the Court stated, "it simply [made] the message
slightly less graphic.'" 00 The indecency statute met the requirements of
the third prong of O'Brien, the Court held, because the "evil" the
state sought to eliminate was not erotic dancing, but public nudity.' 1'
The fourth part of the O'Brien test requires that a regulation's res-
trictions on First Amendment freedoms be no greater than necessary
to achieve the government's interest. 02 Because the interest served by
the statute was prohibition of nudity in public places, the Court held
that Indiana's requirement that dancers in barrooms wear at least pas-
ties and a G-string was the minimum necessary to achieve the state's
purpose.' 3
2. Secondary Effects
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, but he was concerned
with "the possible suffiency of society's moral views to justify the
limitations at issue ... .""04 While acknowledging that Indiana did
not record the indecency statute's legislative history, Souter believed
that an examination of the Court record provided other ample justifi-
cation for the statute.' °0 Specifically, Souter highlighted the petition-
er's brief and its assertion that public nude dancing encouraged such
secondary effects as prostitution and increased sexual assaults."' 6 That
the Indiana Legislature did not enact the statute to combat such sec-
ondary effects was of little importance as long as the state had a cur-
rent interest that was justifiable.' °7
99. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).
100. Id. at 2463.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2469.
106. Id. at 2469 (citing petitioner's brief).
107. Id.
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Justice Souter also did not require that Indiana show that the res-
pondents' establishments in South Bend had in fact caused the sec-
ondary effects mentioned in the state's brief. °8 As the city of Renton,
Washington, did in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,1°9 Indiana
could rely on the experiences of other jurisdictions.110 If, as the Court
found in Renton, showing "adult" films led to pernicious secondary
effects, Indiana could reasonably deduce that live nude dancing would
result in the same effects.' Souter also relied on litigation in the Sev-
enth Circuit that exemplified the Court's findings in Renton."2 After
completing the four-prong O'Brien analysis, Souter found that the
state's interest in preventing prostitution, sexual assaults, and other
criminal activities sufficiently justified the enforcement of the inde-
cency statute against nude barroom dancing." 3
B. First Amendment Not Applicable
Justice Scalia concurred with the plurality and Justice Souter that
the Indiana statute was constitutional." 4 He did not base his holding,
however, on the statute surviving some lower level of First Amend-
ment scrutiny like the O'Brien test. Instead, Scalia asserted that the
statute, as a general law regulating conduct, was not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny at all." 5 Only if the statute was directed at regu-
lating expression would First Amendment analysis be appropriate." 6
Scalia rejected the dissent's three-part argument made in the form
of a syllogism." 7 First, the dissent averred, the only reason to restrict
nudity in public places was to protect nonconsenting parties from of-
fense." 8 Second, only consenting parties would see the respondents'
nude dances." 9 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the reason Indiana
restricted nudity in their establishments was defeated, thus showing
108. Id.
109. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
110. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 2471.
112. Id. at 2470; United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 1989) (prostitution
associated with nude dancing establishment); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 949 (7th Cir.
1989) (prostitution associated with nude dancing establishment).
113. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 (Souter, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2463 (Scaia, J. concurring).
1,15. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2465 (discussing id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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that the state was actually attempting to restrict the communicative
aspects of nude dancing. 2° Justice Scalia emphatically rejected the no-
tion that causing offense to others was the only reason a law should
restrict public nudity.' 2' Neither society in general nor the Constitu-
tion in particular, Scalia emphasized, has ever shared the Thoreauvian
philosophy that one may do as one likes so long as no one else is
injured.' 22 The purpose of the indecency statute, the Justice con-
cluded, was "to enforce the traditional moral belief that people
should not expose [themselves] indiscriminately, regardless of whether
those who see them are disedified."'2
All the Supreme Court's many holdings, Justice Scalia asserted,
supported the conclusion that:
[T]he only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not
directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of
whether the purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not,
that is the end of the matter so far as First Amendment guarantees
are concerned; if so, the court then proceeds to determine whether
there is substantial justification for the proscription.'2
Such a mode of analysis would ensure that governments would only
suppress communication after the conduct-restricting regulations
withstood an enhanced level of scrutiny.' 25
C. Analysis
When reviewing First Amendment expressive conduct cases, why is
the Court responsible for determining if a conduct regulation imposes
a restriction that is "greater than is essential" to meet the purpose of
the statute? Why is the Court responsible for assessing the interests of
the government in restricting conduct and then balancing those inter-
ests against the interests of individuals? In other words, why is the
Court the ultimate arbiter and balancer of competing interests in First
Amendment free speech cases? In Glen Theatre, Justice Scalia an-
swered these questions differently than the plurality and Justice Sou-
ter. As a result, Justice Scalia has taken the lead in restoring judicial
integrity to the Court's proceedings and has thereby become the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2467 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-
23 (D.C. Cir: 1983) (en banc) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd, Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (footnote omitted; emphasis omitted).
125. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court's leading advocate of judicial restraint. The other four mem-
bers of the Court, although they disagree on the particulars of their
analysis, agree that the Court must be judicially active and balance
interests when a regulation on conduct incidentally restricts speech.
1. Judicial Restraint
The system of free speech analysis proposed by Justice Scalia has
already been adopted by the Court in the context of the Free Exercise
Clause. 126 In Employment Division v. Smith,' 27 the Court reviewed an
Oregon law that forbade knowing or intentional possession of con-
trolled substances. This law had been applied to two men who in-
gested peyote, a hallucinogen, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony
of the Native American Church.' s The Court in Smith held that gen-
eral laws not specifically directed at religious practices did not require
heightened First Amendment scrutiny even if they diminished some
people's ability to practice their religion. 2 9 The usefulness of this ap-
proach in the context of expressive conduct is manifest: "while few
[people] can plausibly assert that their illegal conduct is being engaged
in for religious reasons ... almost anyone can violate almost any law
as a means of expression." ' 30 With Smith, the Court has effectively
taken itself out of the business of balancing the interests of religion
against those of the states. No longer will the Court consider how im-
portant a particular practice is to a particular religion and then bal-
ance that interest against the state's interests.' Legislatures will do
whatever balancing of interests that must be done.
The free speech analysis proposed by Justice Scalia would not have
seemed strange a generation or two ago. 32 For most of our nation's
history, the Court limited itself to assuring fairness of procedure, giv-
ing full scope to legislative discretion in matters of the First Amend-
ment. The Court traditionally resisted the temptation of using the
power of judicial review to become a "super legislature.' 3 3
126. Id. The Free Exercise Clause in relevant part states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...... U.S. CONsT.
amend. I.
127. 110S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
128. Id. at 1597.
129. Glen Theatre, I11 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525-26 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(discussing the development of free speech jurisprudence).
133. Id. (quoting Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis and
Holmes, JJ., dissenting)).
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In 1925, for example, the Court reviewed under the First Amend-
ment the conviction of a man arrested for urging class struggle and
revolutionary mass action.' 34 The jury found that the defendant had
by his actions advocated the use of unlawful acts for the purpose of
overthrowing the government. 135 In affirming the conviction, the
Court acknowledged that the State Legislature had, in the constitu-
tional exercise of its discretion, determined that the defendant's utter-
ances were a substantive evil that endangered society. 136 The Court
concluded that the question of whether or not the specific utterance
was likely "to bring about the substantive evil, [w]as not open to [the
Court's] consideration."' 3 7 It was sufficient that the defendant's con-
duct fell within the meaning of the statute and that the statute was a
reasonable exercise of legislative judgment. 138
For most of its history, the Court did not see First Amendment free
speech cases as an exception to the general principle that courts are
not legislatures and should not make policy. It can be inferred from
the Court's opinions that it is not always clear when and what types of
conduct should be given First Amendment protection. 39 Therefore,
reconciling and balancing competing interests was left to the legisla-
tures.Y° The balance they struck was not to be displaced by the courts,
unless it was "outside the pale of fair judgment. ' ' 41
If and when the Court adopts the Smith scheme for First Amend-
ment free speech issues, the Court will have returned to the bedrock
of the Constitution-separation of powers. Then legislatures will leg-
islate, the courts will adjudicate, and ad hoc balancing will end. 42
2. Judicial Activism
The notion that the Court has primary responsibility for balancing
interests when examining restrictions on speech solidified in 1938 with
134. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 656-57 (1925).
135. Id. at 661.
136. Id. at 664.
137. Id. at 670.
138. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 536 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing
Gitlow).
139. See BARRON & DiNSas, supra note 6, § 5:1, at 190-91 (Should an anarchist who shoots
the President be protected under the First Amendment? Should a couple engaged in sexual inter-
course on a public street be protected? The authors assume it is the role of the Court, not legisla-
tures, to determine which acts should be given protection.).
140. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 539-40 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. See BARRON & Dmims, supra note 6, § 5:3, at 200-03 (discussion of the "excessively
subjective" nature of the Court's balancing of interests).
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United States v. Carolene Products C0.'43 Chief Justice Stone, in the
course of his now-famous Carolene Products footnote four, justified
the Court intervening in some issues and not others.144 Specifically,
the Court announced that it would defer to the other branches of gov-
ernment in their regulation of the economy, but the Supreme Court
would intervene actively if legislation appeared to threaten the politi-
cal process. Legislation would no longer be presumed constitutional,
the Court announced, when the legislation appeared, on its face, to be
prohibited by the Bill of Rights and if it restricted the political proc-
ess. 45 The Chief Justice listed "restraints upon the dissemination of
information .. ." among the examples of legislation that would be
considered to restrict the political process. 146
Evidence that the Court was serious about this new role came the
next year. In Schneider v. State47 the Court invalidated restrictions
placed on passing out circulars door-to-door and on the street. The
case involved local ordinances that sought to reduce litter by outlaw-
ing such distributions. 14 There were other, less restrictive means, the
Court asserted, by which a city could reduce litter, "[a]mongst these is
the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the street.' '149
An ordinance that prohibited a person from exercising his constitu-
tional right to hand out circulars, the Court held, must be justified on
grounds more sufficient than desire to keep streets clean and in good
appearance.150
As indicated by Schneider, the Court, when evaluating a restriction
to free speech, now balances the "extent to which communication is
[actually] inhibited" against the "values, interests, or rights served by
enforcing the inhibition."'' To protect its role as the ultimate bal-
143. 304 U.S. 144 (1938); GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 640-41 (discussing the justification of
special protection of speech under the Carolene Products footnote). A year before Carolene
Products, Justice Cardozo had characterized speech in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-
27 (1937), as a fundamental liberty that was an "indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom." See GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 641; see also NowAx, supra note 17, ch. 18
§ III, at 864-65 (discussing basic tests for freedom of speech including the concepts of balancing
and absolutism).
144. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n. 4; But cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-
91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of
announcing a constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote did not purport to announce a
new doctrine, incidentally, it did not have the concurrence of a majority of the Court.")
145. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
146. Id.
147. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
148. Id. at 148-49.
149. Id. at 162; see also MAxRn H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN: A CRumcA ANALYsis
235-37 (1984) (discussion of Schneider).
150. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163.
151. TRmE, supra note 22, § 12-23, at 979.
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ancer of interests in free speech cases, the Court has developed a num-
ber of tools: the Court has applied the clear and present danger test, it
has reduced the presumption of constitutionality given some types of
legislation, it has strictly construed questionable statutes to avoid limi-
ting speech, it has restricted the use of prior restraints and subsequent
punishment, it has liberalized standing requirements, and it has estab-
lished higher procedural due process standards in order to give prefer-
ence to speech over most government functions. 152
3. Court Balancing: Government by Judiciary
If the Court could have limited itself to protecting only that speech
necessary or essential for intelligent self government, it might have
been able to act as a competent balance of interests. But for a number
of reasons, such a limitation was not possible. 5 3 For example, almost
any form or type of speech could become protected political speech
with the simple addition of a public policy proposal at the end. In
addition, important ideas are spread and discovered through types of
speech that are not overtly political.' As a result, since Carolene
Products, the First Amendment has become more than an intellectual
and rational instrument that promotes the discussion of issues be-
tween and among citizens.'5 5 Now the First Amendment, as inter-
preted by the Court, allows individuals and groups to express their
identity and emotions whether or not that expression is necessary or
essential for self-government. 56
Under this expanded view of the First Amendment, the use of in-
sulting and degrading language in public has become a constitutional
right. 157 The people can no longer protect their national symbol from
being trashed in public. 58 Public nude dancing is constitutionally pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.'59 By diluting the essential
seriousness of the need for free speech, and by ignoring the valued
goals underlying free speech, this relentless judicial expansion of the
152. NowK, supra note 17, ch. 18 § III, at 865.
153. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEmpTiNG OF AMERICA 333 (1990).
154. Id.
155. See R. GEORGE WuoHrT, Tn FtrruRE oF F BE SPEECH LAW 3-5 (1990) (discussing the
views of Professors Meiklejohn, Bork, and Bickel on the values served and protected by free
speech).
156. Id. at 4.
157. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (Constitution protects right to wear jacket
bearing the words "F- the Draft" in a courthouse corridor).
158. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Constitution protects right to burn United
States flag in public).
159. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991).
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definition of free speech since Carolene Products has eroded public
support for freedom of speech as a fundamental principle of the Con-
stitution.160
Concurrent with this judicial expansion of the definition of pro-
tected speech, the number and complexity of judicial tests designed to
determine the legitimacy of speech restrictions have increased. 16 The
Court is now required to distinguish between absolute bans on speech
and restrictions placed on the time, place, and manner of the speech;
between restrictions based on content and those that are content neu-
tral; between viewpoint-neutral restrictions and viewpoint-based res-
trictions; and between burdens that incidentally burden speech and
those that directly burden speech. 162 The proliferation of such tests
and distinctions strongly indicate that the right of free speech is
grounded only in one or another type of relativist or subjectivist
thought, completely dependent on the composition of the Court and
the political philosophy that is currently ascendent. If the Court con-
tinues to expand the bounds of protected speech, the right of free
speech will be endangered because it will be seen as an arbitrary socie-
tal preference that is not morally binding. 63
Five persons sitting on the Supreme Court now determine what
speech is protected and what speech is not protected. As the composi-
tion of the Court changes, so do constitutional rights. In 1969, Chief
Justice Warren stated that the people of the United States had the
right to protect the flag from desecration and disgrace.' In 1989, five
Justices took away that 200-year-old right in order to protect an "in-
articulate grunt [that was] indulged in not to express any particular
idea, but to antagonize others.' ' 65 Such capricious decisions threaten
not only the integrity of the First Amendment, but the role of the
judiciary as an impartial dispenser of justice.'6 The Court must
change its approach towards First Amendment free speech jurispru-
dence.
160. WicHTr, supra note 155, at xiii.
"If we wish to honor its intrinsic importance, we do so by supporting free speech principles
intensively, on every appropriate occasion. We do not do so by converting all sorts of mundane
social activities into 'speech' in the constitutional sense." Id. at 6.
161. Id. at 219.
162. Id. at 221.
163. Id. at xiii.
164. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (decision did
not relate to First Amendment right to burn flag).
165. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 528 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(warning that ad hoc judgments will compromise judicial impartiality).
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4. Changing the Court's Approach
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Glen Theater presents an outline for
restoring the Court's integrity and allowing the other branches of gov-
ernment to assume their proper role in balancing interests when devel-
oping policy. First, free speech cases should be bifurcated: those that
seek to restrict conduct without regard to any particular message and
those that are directed at restricting the message. 67 Second, those re-
gulations designed to restrict conduct without regard to message con-
tent should be reviewed using a rational basis test, not a balance of
interests test such as O'Brien. 6s Finally, only those conduct regula-
tions designed to restrict a particular message should be reviewed
against the heightened First Amendment standard. 169 This system of
analysis would allow the Court to avoid judicially assessing the impor-
tance of particular government interests, especially those with aspects
of morality such as nudity.170
IV. STATUS OF PUBLIC NuDrrY LAW IN FLORIDA
It is against the law to dance nude in public places under the Florida
indecent exposure statute.' 7' This statute, however, does not encom-
pass all public nudity, such as urinating or sleeping naked in public,
and it requires a lascivious exposition or exhibition of sexual or-
gans.'7 To overcome these limitations, local communities have en-
acted their own laws.'7 3
The primary basis for most laws in Florida that proscribe public
nudity in enclosed spaces is the Twenty-First Amendment. Although
the amendment does not directly confer the same authority on munici-
palities and counties, the power to do so is derived from the Florida
Constitution and related statutes. 174 Because cities and counties have
authority to pass ordinances in the interest of the public health, peace,
safety, morals and the general welfare of their citizens and inhabi-
tants, municipalities and counties may regulate establishments that seli
alcohol. 75
167. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2556, 2463 (1991) (Scalia J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2465-66.
169. Id. at 2466.
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 800.03 (1989).
172. Payne v. State, 463 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Goodmakers v. State, 450 So. 2d
888, 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
173. See, e.g., Fillingim v. Boone, 835 F.2d 1389(llth Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 1394.
175. Id. at 1394-95; see also Fillingim v. State, 446 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (consti-
tutional for counties and municipalities to regulate nudity in establishments serving alcohol);
FLA. CONnT. art. VIII, § l(f) (unchartered counties); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2(b), 5 (munici-
palities); FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(o), (w) (1989) (counties).
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Glen Theatre has expanded the ability of communities to control
public nudity in places other than establishments that sell alcohol. To
be found constitutional, the regulations will have to clearly relate to a
government interest other than some message that may be communi-
cated by those appearing nude. Although a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court appears willing to defer to public morality as a
basis for restricting public nudity, communities should tie the regula-
tion to some secondary effect such as prostitution or increased sexual
assaults. If possible, communities should document the secondary ef-
fects and the negative effect they have on life in the community.
V. CONCLUSION
Glen Theatre validated the conclusion of the Florida Supreme
Court in 1971 that states could regulate public nude dancing. How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not agree with the Florida high court that
nude dancing was out of the realm of First Amendment analysis.
Rather, the Court balanced the interests of the state against those of
the nude dancers and determined that the states' interest in upholding
public morality and preventing pernicious secondary effects out-
weighed the incidental infringement on the communicative aspects of
nude dancing.
Glen Theatre indicates that the Supreme Court will remain judi-
cially active in First Amendment Free Speech Clause issues. The fu-
ture decisions reached by the Rehnquist Court may differ from
earlier, more politically liberal Courts, but the basis of those decisions
will be the same: the Court will actively review decisions of the na-
tional and state legislatures even when they only incidentally infringe
on an element of communication.
In contrast, Justice Scalia used Glen Theater to advocate a return to
the tradition of judicial restraint and the doctrine of the separation of
powers. Under Justice Scalia's approach, whenever legislation only in-
cidently infringes upon an element of communication, the Court will
defer to the state and national legislatures in balancing free speech
interests against the needs of public policy. When, however, the law-
making bodies direct their legislation at the message being communi-
cated, the Court will examine the constitutionality of the free speech
infringement using strict scrutiny.
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